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THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT (Synthesis) is an initiative of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to 
produce relevant, concise, and thought-provoking briefs and reports on today’s important health 
policy issues. By synthesizing what is known, while weighing the strength of ﬁ ndings and exposing 
gaps in knowledge, Synthesis products give decision-makers reliable information and new insights to 
inform complex policy decisions. For more information about the Synthesis Project, visit the Synthesis 
Project’s Web site at www.policysynthesis.org. For additional copies of Synthesis products, please go 
to the Project’s Web site or send an e-mail request to pubsrequest@rwjf.org.
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Over the 1990s the hospital industry underwent a wave of consolidation that transformed the 
inpatient hospital market place (Figure 1). By the mid-1990s, hospital merger and acquisition 
activity was nine times its level at the start of the decade. The wave of mergers dramatically 
increased market concentration for inpatient hospital services as measured by the Herfi ndahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI).1 In 1990, the typical person living in a metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) faced a concentrated hospital market with an HHI of 1,576. By 2003, however, the 
typical MSA resident faced a hospital market with an HHI of 2,323. This change is equivalent 
to a reduction from six to four competing local hospital systems. By 1990, almost 90 percent of 
people in populous MSAs sought care in highly concentrated markets.2 
Figure 1. Trends in hospital mergers and acquisitions, 1990–2003
Source: American Hospital Association and authors’ calculations
Figure 1 graphs the total number of horizontal mergers, acquisitions and system expansions (we refer to this collective 
consolidation activity as “M&A”) across populous metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) from 1990 to 2003.
Facing increasing growth rates in hospital spending, stakeholders and policy-makers have 
raised concerns that market concentration has increased the price of inpatient care. Several 
stakeholder groups, including the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association and the American 
Hospital Association have published studies on this issue, with divergent results (4, 9–14). The 
Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice have recently held extensive hearings on 
competition in health care markets and released a report on these issues (9). 
This synthesis summarizes the research on hospital consolidation to assess the likely effects 
of past and possible future hospital consolidation on health care prices, costs and quality. We 
critically examine the available research and reach conclusions based on our assessment of the 
literature, noting where evidence is inconclusive, lacking, or otherwise limited. 
Introduction
1  For these purposes we are defining a market to be a metropolitan statistical area.
2 According to the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies, a market with HHI greater than 1,800 is highly concentrated. In 1990, 71 
percent of populous MSAs, representing a population of 56.2 million people, were highly concentrated. By 2003, 88 percent of 
populous MSAs, representing a population of 122 million people, were highly concentrated. We define a populous MSA to be an 
MSA with population equal to or greater than 100,000.
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The synthesis distills the research ﬁ ndings on the following questions:
1. What were the reasons for the wave of hospital consolidation during the 1990s?
2. What are the effects of hospital consolidation on the price of inpatient care? 
3. What are the effects of hospital consolidation on the quality of inpatient care? 
4. What are the effects of hospital consolidation on hospital costs? 
 
What were the reasons for the wave of hospital consolidation during 
the 1990s? 
The hospital consolidation wave was national in scope, but was most striking in 
the South. Average hospital concentration increased substantially across all regions (Figure 2), 
but increased the most in absolute terms in the South, where a greater percentage of hospitals 
consolidated and there was relatively little hospital regulation. Hospital consolidation varies 
regionally because of differing demographic histories, differences in past and present regulatory 
environments, differences in the structure of health insurance markets and differences in the 
number of beds per capita and the age distribution of the existing hospitals. 
Figure 2. Changes in hospital consolidation by region
Region
Average HHI
2003
Change in hospital HHI 
1990–2003
Percent of hospitals 
that consolidated from 
1990–2003
East 1,982 697 7.0
Midwest 2,356 743 7.4
South 3,016 939 9.4
Southwest 2,494 674 6.7
West 2,242 548 5.5
Source: American Hospital Association and authors’ calculations
Economic theory suggests that many changes in the competitive environment 
may cause merger waves. Changes in demand, input prices, fi nancial markets, tax laws or 
production technology all can affect the relative benefi ts of consolidation. In surveys, hospital 
executives most commonly cite: 1) strengthening their fi nancial position, 2) achieving operating 
effi ciencies, and 3) consolidating services as reasons for merging (3). Although many potential 
causes of increased merger activity may exist, signifi cant ongoing consolidation cannot proceed 
unless antitrust enforcers, the courts, or both allow it. 
Research does not provide conclusive evidence for why the merger wave 
occurred. Several market changes that might have spurred consolidation occurred in the 1990s, 
and disentangling their effects is diffi cult. During this period, for example, technological progress 
in medical treatments moved many inpatient procedures to the outpatient setting and lowered 
the length of stay for remaining inpatient procedures. These technological advances reduced the 
demand for inpatient hospital beds leaving the hospital industry with excess capacity. Rationalizing 
the reduction of capacity may be more easily accomplished if hospitals combine operations. 
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While the research ﬁ ndings are mixed, the preponderance of the evidence suggests 
that the rise in manage care did not cause the hospital merger wave. Over the 
1990s, both hospital consolidation and HMO penetration rose dramatically (Figure 3), suggesting 
a possible association between the two. Theory provides some support for this view. The rise of 
managed care probably reduced the profi t margins of hospitals; and some theories of hospital 
mergers predict that a decrease in profi t margins increases the gains from a merger.
Figure 3. HMO penetration in populous MSAs, 1990–2000*
Source: InterStudy 
* Annual, population-weighted, average HMO penetration (Medicaid, Medicare, commercial) from 1990 to 2000 in MSAs with 
population over 100,000.
A natural way to test the association of managed care and hospital consolidation is to compare 
hospital consolidation activity in locations that experienced large increases in managed care 
penetration with activity in those locations that did not have large increases. Three papers perform 
this type of analysis. One study of large cities (8) fi nds a positive correlation between the level of 
managed care activity in 1985 and the growth in hospital concentration between 1985 and 1994. 
A later study (16), however, fi nds no relationship between managed care penetration and hospital 
consolidation. A third (15) uses individual hospital data and again fi nds little association between 
managed care penetration and the likelihood that a hospital will be acquired. 
On balance, the evidence from quantitative studies suggests that the rise of managed care is not 
correlated with hospital merger activity, although the small number of studies and mixed evidence 
tempers this conclusion. Nevertheless, qualitative anecdotal accounts often point to “managed care” 
as the reason for hospital consolidation, suggesting that the threat of managed care, rather than its 
actual realization, may have played a role in the merger wave. 
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What are the effects of hospital consolidation on the price of 
inpatient care?
Research suggests that hospital consolidation in the 1990s raised prices by at 
least ﬁ ve percent and likely by signiﬁ cantly more. The great weight of the literature shows 
that hospital consolidation leads to price increases, although a few studies reach the opposite 
conclusion. Studies that examine consolidation among hospitals that are geographically close to 
one another consistently fi nd that consolidation leads to price increases of 40 percent or more.
There are three approaches to hospital price competition research: the structure-
conduct-performance approach, the event study approach and the simulation approach.3 Because 
each approach uses a different methodology and makes different measurement assumptions, 
the resulting literature presents different fi ndings on the pricing consequences of hospital 
consolidation. For example, simulation studies have produced estimates of consolidation-specifi c 
price increases of as much as 53 percent. In contrast, the strongest examples of the event study 
approach estimate 10–40 percent price increases, while the structure-conduct-performance approach 
yields lower estimates of 4–5 percent. The following material discusses each approach in greater 
detail and offers examples of well-constructed studies using the different methodologies.
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Studies
According to the strongest SCP literature, inpatient prices increased ﬁ ve percent in 
the 1990s due to hospital consolidation. A typical study using the SCP approach estimates 
the association between the price of a hospital’s inpatient care and the structure of the market in 
which the hospital competes (typically measured by the HHI). SCP studies do not analyze actual 
mergers. Instead, the idea is to learn the relationship between price and HHI and then to use that 
relationship to predict how the merger will affect price. For example, if we know that markets with 
an HHI of 2800 tend to have a price fi ve percent higher than do markets with an HHI of 2000, 
then we might conclude that a merger increasing HHI from 2000 to 2800 would result in a price 
increase of fi ve percent.
The SCP methodology requires assessment of several diffi cult-to-measure variables, including price 
of services, market structure and factors that affect hospital costs. Because researchers using this 
approach exercise wide latitude in how they defi ne and measure those variables, inconsistencies 
and even inaccuracies can creep into the fi ndings. As we discuss in the methodological appendix 
(Appendix II), even well conducted SCP studies have signifi cant shortcomings and tend to 
underestimate the effect of consolidation on prices. Figure 4 offers an overview of the measurement 
variations that can affect SCP fi ndings. 
3 For more information on the distinct methodologies of each approach, and for a discussion on the measurement assumptions 
and challenges that may qualify their results, refer to Appendix II. 
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Figure 4. Analysis of alternative measurement approaches used in SCP studies
Measure Weaker approach Stronger approach
Price • Charges
• Discounts from charges
• Adjusted charges
Transaction prices with controls for:
• Patient conditions and severity
• Insurance type
Deﬁ nition of 
the market
• MSAs 
• Counties
Hospital-speciﬁ c deﬁ nition:
• Fixed radius
• Patient ﬂ ows 
Controls for 
marginal costs
No or poorly designed controls 
for marginal costs
Controls for marginal costs include:
• Wages
• Scale of operations
• Hospital teaching status
• Hospital ownership status
Of particular note among the SCP studies are one by Keeler et al. (36),4 which uses strong market 
defi nition, strong cost controls and reasonable pricing data and another by Capps and Dranove 
(19), which uses transaction prices, strong market defi nition and reasonable cost controls.5 Both 
of these studies also use reasonably recent data. These two studies give an average estimate for the 
merger effect of about fi ve percent. 
Figure 5, adapted, expanded, and updated from (34), describes the SCP studies included in our 
review.6 In addition to descriptive information on study date, geographical area, hospital services 
covered and price measures, the table highlights the studies with the strongest defi nitions of 
measures and estimates the price impact that each study implies.
 
4 This study appears to use an incorrect method to calculate HHI—one which ignores joint ownership of hospitals. To the extent 
that this introduces measurement error into their HHI, one might expect that their results understate the impact of HHI on price.
5 A previous study by the same research group (41) is also strong; however, it uses older data.
6 We used the results of each study to calculate the price increase that would result from a merger of two firms in a market with 
five equally sized firms, assuming no reallocation of output after the merger. This amounts to a change in the HHI from 2000 to 
2800, or an increase of 800 points. As we discuss in the introduction, average HHI in populous MSAs rose by 747 points (1,576 
to 2,323) over 1993–2000. Obviously, there is some art involved in bringing 13 dissimilar studies onto the same footing in this way. 
Some studies used the number of firms, rather than the HHI, for example, in which case we considered a merger from 5 to 4. 
Where it makes a difference, we assume that the merging hospitals are not-for-profit.
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Event Studies
The best event studies ﬁ nd that, relative to controls, hospital prices rose 10 
percent and more after mergers. The fi ndings in this literature are heterogeneous, but the 
weight of the evidence and the best evidence indicate large effects of hospital consolidation on price.
In event studies of hospital mergers, researchers use data from before and after 
mergers to assess the effect of consolidation on price. The price changes at merging 
hospitals are contrasted with price changes at control (non-merging) hospitals, and the difference 
between these changes is taken to be the effect of the merger. To capture the effects of within-
market mergers (the ones that are most likely to have implications for competition), one must 
identify merging fi rms in the same market, which requires a proper market defi nition. Second, 
as before, price must be properly measured. Third, an adequate control group must be found. To 
do so, one must identify hospitals similar to the merging hospitals in other markets that neither 
merged themselves nor were affected by any other hospitals’ merger (Appendix II). 
The most recent and strongest event study ﬁ nds that consolidation raises prices 
by 40 percent. In this study, Dafny (24) measures the effect of a merger, not on price increases at 
the merging hospitals but on the prices charged by rivals of the merging fi rms, thereby addressing 
Figure 5. Summary of structure-conduct-performance literature*
Study Data Price Measurement strengths
Year Place Services Measure
Merger 
effect
Noether (43) 1977–78 U.S. Various 
diagnoses
Charges -1% Controls for marginal costs
Staten, Umbeck and 
Dunkelberg (45)
1983 IN All inpatient Discounts 
from charges
+2%
Melnick et al. (41) 1987 CA All inpatient Transaction 
price
+2% Price measure, market deﬁ nition, 
controls for marginal cost
Dranove, Shanley and 
White (29)
1988 CA Hospital cost 
centers
Adjusted 
charges
+5%
Dranove and Ludwick 
(27)
1989 CA 10 common 
procedures
Adjusted 
charges
+17% Controls for marginal cost
Lynk (38) 1989 CA 10 common 
procedures
Adjusted 
charges
-1% Controls for marginal cost
Brooks, Dor and 
Wong (18)
1988–92 U.S. Appendectomy Transaction 
price
+2% Price measure
Simpson and Shin (44) 1993 CA All discharges Net revenue 
per discharge
+10% Controls for marginal cost
Keeler, Melnick and 
Zwanziger (36)
1994 CA 10 common 
procedures
Adjusted 
charges
+6% Market deﬁ nition, 
controls for marginal cost
Lynk and Neumann (39) 1995 MI All inpatient Transaction 
price
-3% Price measure
Dor, Grossman and 
Koroukian (25)
1995–96 U.S. Heart bypass Transaction 
price
+2% Price measure
Dor, Koroukian and 
Grossman (26)
1995–96 U.S. Angioplasty Transaction 
price
+3% Price measure
Capps and Dranove (19) 1997–01 Various All inpatient Transaction 
price
+4% Price measure, 
market deﬁ nition
* The merger effect is the effect on price predicted by the study for a consolidation from ﬁ ve equally sized hospitals to four hospitals in the market, amounting to an 
increase in the HHI from 2,000 to 2,800.
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selection concerns. The analysis of rival hospitals is particularly interesting because economic 
theory predicts that when fi rms merge to enhance their market power, their prices and also those 
of their rivals will rise. Dafny focuses on mergers between closely neighboring hospitals that are 
likely to have competitive consequences. The study concludes that mergers raise prices by about 
40 percent in the long run. The care with which merging hospitals are identifi ed (only merging 
hospitals within 0.3 miles of each other are used) and the use of rival analysis make this a strong 
event study. The price measure, however, is not ideal.
A study by Vita and Sacher (47) analyzes the 1990 merger of the two hospitals in Santa Cruz, 
Calif. Prices at the merged hospital rose about 23 percent and prices at the nearby rival rose 
about 17 percent relative to controls, supporting the notion that when merging fi rms raise prices, 
it is easier for rivals to do so as well. The strength of this study is its careful attention to the 
identifi cation and description of the Santa Cruz market for hospital services and its careful search 
for a comparable set of control hospitals. Its weakness is the diffi culty in generalizing from a 
single merger. 
Krishnan (37) analyzes mergers in the states of Ohio and California between 1994 and 1995 
involving 22 and 15 hospitals, respectively. She uses the merging hospitals as their own control 
group by comparing procedures in which the merger increased HHI by 2000 or more with 
procedures for which the merger increased HHI by less than 250. She fi nds that prices (adjusted 
charges) rose about 10 percent more in the concentration-enhancing procedures than in the non-
concentration-enhancing procedures. The strength of this study is its solution to the problem of 
fi nding a comparable control group, but it uses a problematic price measurement and an overly 
broad market defi nition.
Capps and Dranove (19) use transactions prices from a PPO to analyze 12 hospitals involved in 
HHI-enhancing consolidation between 1997 and 2001. They fi nd large price increases among these 
hospitals relative to controls. Some of the differences were spectacular, with one hospital raising 
prices 66 percent relative to 0 percent at the median control hospital. 
Other studies reach different conclusions, but the evidence is weaker. Connor et al. (21) and 
Connor and Feldman (22) examine 122 hospital mergers occurring from 1986 through 1994. They 
compare price changes in areas with and without mergers. Unlike other studies, they fi nd that 
prices rose more slowly in merger than in non-merger areas except where concentration was high to 
begin with. These studies are not as strong as the others because they used an overly broad market 
defi nition, poorly selected controls and a fl awed price measure.
Simulation Studies
Simulation studies ﬁ nd large merger-induced price increases, even in markets that 
would be judged quite competitive by other methods. Using the unique methodology of 
this approach, researchers have found price increases: 1) often greater than fi ve percent even in the 
relatively unconcentrated Los Angeles market, 2) of more than ten percent even in the relatively 
unconcentrated San Diego market, and 3) of more than 50 percent in a merger from triopoly to 
duopoly in San Luis Obispo, Calif.
The strongest simulation studies have revealed the importance of geographical 
distance in mediating the effects of consolidation. Mergers among hospitals that are close 
together geographically generate greater price increases than do mergers among distant hospitals. 
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The newest approach to hospital price competition research examines 
hypothetical hospital mergers via simulation. In other words, researchers use existing data 
to estimate the demand, market power and cost conditions facing the various hospitals in a given 
market. This comprehensive information forms a virtual model of the market in which researchers 
can play out hypothetical scenarios—such as a hospital merger—and analyze their effects.7
The earliest simulation analysis of hospital competition is Town and Vistnes (46). Considering Los 
Angeles and Orange Counties, Calif. in the early 1990s the authors estimate the demand for hospital 
inpatient care and fi nd that many hospital mergers in their sample would result in price increases at 
the merging hospitals of more than fi ve percent. Though this estimate may seem modest, in context 
these are large merger effects: there are over one hundred twenty hospitals in the two counties 
studied, and a merger between any two of them would have a small effect on the HHI of this area.
Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (20) use a similar framework to examine hospital mergers in 
San Diego County for 1991, and fi nd a more than ten percent merger effect from a merger among 
three hospitals in the southern suburbs. Again this is a large effect, given that San Diego County 
had 25 hospitals in 1991.
Gaynor and Vogt (34) model the market for inpatient hospital care at virtually all community 
hospitals in California in 1995 and fi nd that a three-to-two hospital merger in San Luis Obispo, 
which was attempted but prevented by the FTC, would have raised prices by more than 50 percent, 
a much larger rise than would have been predicted by the SCP literature summarized above. Ho 
(35) takes the next step in this literature, using actual transaction prices and fi nds that consolidated 
hospitals have prices 15 percent higher than independent counterparts. 
What are the effects of hospital consolidation on the quality of care?
A slim majority of studies ﬁ nd that, at least for some procedures, increases in 
hospital concentration reduce quality. The strongest studies conﬁ rm this result. 
We identifi ed 10 studies that examined the direct effect of hospital market concentration on 
quality of care. The studies are summarized in Figure 6. The fi ndings from this literature run the 
gamut of possible results. Of the 10 studies reviewed, fi ve fi nd that concentration reduces quality 
for at least some procedures, four papers fi nd quality increases for at least some procedures and 
three studies fi nd no effect.
On balance, the evidence suggests that increasing hospital concentration lowers quality. This 
fi nding has caveats, however. It is not robust across the research and there are signifi cant holes 
in our knowledge. This conclusion is sensitive to both type of procedure and geography. Clearly, 
more work is needed that addresses basic methodological hurdles. 
The best of these papers use national samples, rely on changes in concentration to identify the 
effect of competition on quality and formulate concentration measures that are less prone to 
reverse causality (56, 57).8 (If patients are more likely to go to high quality hospitals, there can be 
reverse causality. That is, an increase in a hospital’s quality may cause changes in the market HHI.) 
7 Over the last 10 years, merger simulation has become a common practice in the prospective evaluation of mergers for antitrust 
purposes (c.f. 31, 32, 48).
8 Another paper that uses actual mergers to assess the impact of hospital competition on quality (58) yields imprecise estimates of 
the impact of hospital mergers on the quality of care.
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These papers fi nd that increasing hospital concentration decreases quality. Furthermore, Kessler 
and McClellan (57) fi nd that HMO penetration affects this relationship—in areas with a signifi cant 
HMO presence hospital concentration decreases quality while in areas without a signifi cant HMO 
presence, there is no relationship. 
What are the effects of hospital consolidation on the cost of providing 
inpatient care?
The balance of the evidence indicates that hospital consolidation produces 
some cost savings and that these cost savings can be signiﬁ cant when hospitals 
consolidate their services more fully. Two recent, strong cost function studies (69, 76) fi nd 
increasing returns to scale for merged entities as does one recent strong event study (75); however, at 
least one recent high-quality study does not (85).
When interpreting the evidence on hospital costs, it is important to keep two distinctions clearly in 
mind. The phrase “cost savings” means a savings in cost to the hospital. It does not mean a savings in 
cost from the point of view of payers. Also, “hospital consolidation” comes in two types: ownership 
consolidation only and facilities consolidation. An ownership (or system) consolidation occurs 
when two formerly independent hospitals come to be owned by the same fi rm, but continue each 
to offer roughly the same service lines as they did before the merger. A facilities consolidation 
Author
Geographic 
scope Patients
Type of data 
analyzed Quality measure
Effect of increasing 
concentration on quality
Shortell et al. 
(64)
Multiple 
states
All Cross-section Mortality for 16 conditions/ 
procedures aggregated
No effect
Hamilton and Ho 
(58)
CA All Mergers Newborn 48 hour discharge 
rate, AMI, stroke mortality
No effect
Kessler and 
McClellan (57)
U.S. Medicare Longitudinal AMI mortality Decreases
Mukamel et al. 
(59)
U.S. Medicare Cross-section All cause, AMI, CHF, 
pneumonia and stroke 
mortality
No effect
Sari (62) U.S. All Longitudinal 7 HCUP QI categories Decreases
Mukamel et al. 
(60)
CA All Cross-section All cause, AMI, CHF, 
pneumonia and stroke 
mortality
Increases
Gowrisankaran 
and Town (55)
LA county All Cross-section AMI and pneumonia 
mortality
Decreases for HMO patients; 
increases for Medicare 
patients
Shen (63) U.S. Medicare Longitudinal AMI mortality No effect
Kessler and 
Geppert (56)
U.S. Medicare Longitudinal AMI mortality Decreases
Volpp et al. 
(66)
NJ and NY 
state
Under-65 Longitudinal Cardiac catheterization rate, 
revascularization rate, 
AMI mortality
Increases
Mutter and Wong 
(61)
U.S. All Cross-section 38 HCUP QI measures Increases for some proce-
dures, decreases for others
Figure 6. Studies of hospital concentration and quality
occurs when an ownership consolidation is followed either by the closure of one of the hospitals 
or by a signifi cant consolidation of service lines across the merging hospitals.
Hospitals often claim that there are important economies of scale in their industry. 
They state that it costs less to produce hospital care in a larger hospital than in a smaller one, and, 
therefore, that it will cost less to produce the same care at the larger, post-merger scale. 
Hospitals also claim that merging will allow them to reduce the amount they 
spend on the “medical arms race.” The medical arms race is the allegedly wasteful non-
price competition hospitals engage in over the acquisition of, for example, helicopters, open-
heart surgical suites and various advanced medical technologies. 
The event study literature shows lower cost growth for merged hospitals but 
the evidence is weakened by ﬂ awed controls. Event studies of hospital costs identify 
hospital mergers, collect data on costs for the merging hospitals and a control group, and 
then compare costs and cost growth between the merging and non-merging hospitals. Several 
studies (21, 67, 71, 84) covering hospital mergers that occurred from the mid 1980s through the 
mid 1990s fi nd that cost growth was slower, post-merger, at merging hospitals than it was at 
control hospitals. All of these event studies have signifi cant problems with differences between 
the merger and control groups, however, so we should be cautious in drawing conclusions 
from them.
Consolidations involving actual consolidation of facilities seem to lower hospital 
costs, while those not combining facilities produce no appreciable effects. 
Dranove and Lindrooth (75) do the best job of matching merging hospitals to similar controls. 
They use a statistical technique called propensity score matching to match merging hospitals with 
the non-merging hospitals that look most similar. Furthermore, they distinguish between two 
types of mergers: mergers in which the two merging hospitals continue to operate with separate 
hospital licenses and mergers in which the two merging hospitals give up one license and operate 
under a single license. These latter cases, they argue, are more likely to represent mergers in which 
true consolidation of the hospitals’ services occurred. Of the 122 mergers between 1989 and 
1996 they study, 81 were license-combining. They fi nd signifi cant (about 14 percent) cost savings 
in the case of license-combining mergers and no signifi cant cost savings in the non-license-
combining mergers.
Managed care expansion cools the medical arms race, lowering hospital costs. 
Hospital concentration seems to temper, not enhance, this effect. A study set in 
the early 1990s (68) fi nds that rising managed care penetration reduces cost growth in relatively 
unconcentrated hospital markets but not in relatively concentrated ones. This fi nding counters 
the claim that merging will allow hospitals to reduce the amount spent on the medical arms race.
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Any review of the scholarly literature can only be a snapshot in time. With that in mind, we offer 
our conclusions on hospital consolidation from our review of what we know now:
• From 1990–2003 there was a large, 
national wave of hospital consolidation.
• The average metropolitan resident saw a 
reduction in hospital competition, effectively, 
from six to four local competitors.
• By 2003, at least 88 percent of metropolitan 
residents lived in highly concentrated hospital 
markets, and probably more non-metropolitan 
residents did so as well.
• Consolidation occurred throughout the U.S., 
but was most signifi cant in the South.
• The best quantitative evidence suggests that 
consolidation was not driven by the rise of 
managed care, although the results of the 
literature are mixed and the fear of managed 
care may still have contributed.
• The balance of the evidence indicates that 
the 1990–2003 consolidation in metropolitan 
areas raised hospital prices by at least fi ve 
percent and likely by signifi cantly more.
• There is evidence from several studies 
indicating that consolidation among hospitals 
that are geographically close to one another 
lead to large price increases. Studies have found consolidation-specifi c price increases of 
40 percent and more.
• Although the results of the literature are mixed, a narrow balance of the evidence and the 
evidence from the best studies indicates that hospital consolidation more likely decreases 
quality than increases it.
• Although the results of the literature are mixed, the balance of the evidence indicates that 
hospital facility consolidation produces cost savings for the consolidated hospitals.
The rise in consolidation in local hospital markets raises several issues and trade-offs for policy-
makers to consider. 
Hospital markets in most parts of the country have not become monopolized. As Figure 1 
shows, the typical MSA had slightly more than four effective competitors in 2002. In most industries, 
market consolidation goes in waves. Should there be another unchecked wave of hospital competition 
in the future, such a wave is likely to result in higher prices and lower quality. In some markets, 
there may be a monopoly provider, and these markets present special challenges for regulators.
The Evanston Case
Prior to the Evanston case, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have been 
unsuccessful in seven consecutive attempts 
to block hospital mergers and had not won 
a hospital case since 1989.
An October 2005 ruling to dissolve a 2000 
merger in Evanston, Ill. reverses this pattern 
and is an important landmark for at least 
three reasons. First, the court found that the 
hospital market was geographically limited. 
Second, the court found that a modest 
increase in concentration led to a signiﬁ cant 
increase in hospital prices. Third, the judge 
ordered the divesture of the merged entity. 
The Evanston case highlights the 
importance of understanding the impact 
of hospital concentration on prices, costs 
and quality of inpatient care. The ruling also 
establishes that consummated hospital 
mergers raising antitrust issues may be 
reexamined. 
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Implications for Policy-Makers
Geographical markets for hospital services appear to be narrower than courts 
have typically found to date. Properly assessing the geographical market for hospital care is 
a critical step in the evaluation of hospital mergers. Consolidation between closely neighboring 
hospitals appears to lead to signifi cant price increases even in markets that would appear to be 
relatively competitive under typical market defi nition strategies.
Policy-makers might consider encouraging new hospital entry as a way to 
increase competition, but this raises several issues. There are a number of mechanisms 
policy-makers might use to increase competition by encouraging new hospital entry including 
relaxing CON laws and restrictions on specialty hospitals. It is important to consider, however, 
possible costs associated with entry. For example, if specialty hospitals focus only on profi table 
lines of business, they may impair general hospitals’ ability to deliver quality care to patients in 
unprofi table lines of business. Furthermore, in markets with excess capacity, additional entry may 
exacerbate this problem, increasing health care costs.
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The Need for Additional Information
There are a number of important areas for future research:
• Studies to reconcile the differing results in the three areas of the price and consolidation 
literature are needed to determine which estimates are more accurate.
• Validation studies of merger effects are needed. A validation study would use transactions 
prices to look at consummated mergers and ask which of the currently available models of 
hospital competition would have best predicted the price effects of the merger.
• New quality and competition studies incorporating better measures of competition (i.e. 
moving away from the SCP methods) and incorporating more and better measures of quality 
are needed.
• Studies of the interaction between provider and insurer market power are needed. Hospitals 
and physicians often complain about the market power of insurers and further claim that 
provider consolidation is needed to “level the playing fi eld.” Today, little is known about 
the effects of insurer market power on provider markets and nothing is known about the 
interaction between insurer and provider market power.
• Research is needed on how changing health care practice—which increasingly moves care 
from hospitals and towards both preventive and highly specialized and pharmaceutical-based 
treatment—will shift the nature of hospital competition and the effect of hospital mergers.
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Hospital Pricing
Although the question of what impact hospital consolidation has on hospital prices sounds 
straightforward, in practice it is not. First, what do we mean by a hospital’s price? Hospitals 
sell hundreds of different products: treatment for a heart attack, treatment for pneumonia, etc. 
Researchers deal with this problem in a number of different ways. Some calculate revenue per 
day or revenue per discharge, essentially assuming that either hospital days or discharges are 
homogenous. Other researchers calculate some sort of price index. That is, they calculate separate 
prices for treatment for heart attack, treatment for pneumonia, etc. and then average these prices 
together in a standardized way.
Further problems arise in dealing with severity. A heart attack may be mild or severe. The person 
having a heart attack may be relatively healthy or he may have many other diseases. Failing to deal 
with these problems may bias the results of research. Some hospitals treat mostly simple cases, and 
some hospitals treat more complex cases. If a researcher does not have a good way to adjust for case 
mix and severity, he will overestimate the prices of hospitals with severe cases and underestimate 
the prices of hospitals with easier cases.
Hospitals’ products are sold to patients holding different types of insurance coverage such as 
Medicare, Medicaid, fee-for-service plans, point-of-service plans, health maintenance organizations 
and preferred provider organizations. In addition, patients without health insurance either pay for 
themselves out of pocket or depend on charity care. Hospitals charge different prices for patients 
with different types of coverage, and may also charge different prices to different insurers within 
each plan type. Some of this complexity may be safely ignored. Since a government authority sets 
Medicare and often Medicaid prices, they are essentially unresponsive to competitive conditions, 
so that research on pricing and consolidation should (and generally does) focus only on private 
sources of payment.
Few good data sources on hospital prices exist. Hospital “charges” are commonly available in data 
collected by state governments. Charges are list prices for the hospital’s services. Virtually all payers 
demand and receive discounts from charges, however; only those paying out of pocket may face 
full charges. Furthermore the sizes of these discounts vary from hospital to hospital and payer to 
payer. Thus, hospital charges are nearly useless as a price measure. 
There are two popular approaches to collecting price data. First, some states, notably California, 
collect fi nancial data at the hospital level, which identify gross revenues (aggregate charges) and net 
revenues (aggregate actual payments) by payer type. Researchers then “adjust” individual charge 
data by multiplying them by the ratio of net revenues to charges. A second approach involves 
the use of insurance company claims data. Some researchers have been able to obtain claims 
reimbursement data from health insurers and to use those data to construct actual prices. The 
fi rst approach has the strength that all the data for a state is represented; however, it requires the 
assumption that discounts from charges are uniform across payers. The second approach has the 
strength that actual prices are observed; however, this approach is necessarily less representative 
since only insurers who are willing to share data are included in the study.
Studies Of Consolidation And Inpatient Prices
Even well-conducted studies depend for their validity on underlying assumptions about how 
the world works. Each of the study types we discuss in this section requires different kinds of 
assumptions to be valid.
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Because they are easy to perform, SCP studies form the bulk of our evidence on the effects of 
consolidation on prices; however, there are strong reasons to believe that these studies, even when 
well-conducted, produced biased estimates of the relationship of interest and that the typical bias 
will be toward fi nding an effect smaller than the true effect. This is because the key variable used 
to proxy market structure and market power, HHI, is affected by numerous factors left out of the 
model. For example, large cities may have both high prices (because of high costs) and low HHI 
because many hospitals are needed to service the population. If the study does not adequately 
control for cost differences, this correlation will introduce bias. Similarly, markets that are highly 
profi table because demand is high or inelastic will have both high HHI and high prices.
In evaluating an SCP study, several considerations are critical. First, price should be measured 
accurately, with transaction prices being much more reliable than measures based on charges. 
Second, market structure should be measured accurately. To do so requires that the analyst identify 
the market a fi rm competes in correctly—that is, the analyst must fi nd all of a fi rm’s competitors. 
Excluding relevant competitors makes HHI too large, and including fi rms that are not competitors 
makes HHI too small. Third, factors affecting hospitals’ costs (labor costs, scale of operations, 
capacity utilization and potentially other factors) must be included and well measured to avoid 
confounding cost differences with structure differences.
 
There are numerous other reasons to believe that the estimated price-HHI relationship will be 
biased even in well-conducted SCP studies (30, 34). This conclusion does not mean the studies 
have no value. They provide an important method of summarizing the price-concentration patterns 
in the data, and, as long as we keep in mind the existence and likely direction of the (unavoidable) 
bias, they provide important information. 
Event studies suffer from several important limitations as well. As we discuss below, market 
defi nition and control group selection are the critical study design elements in an event study. 
Either poor market defi nition or poor control group selection is likely to produce biased results.
Finally, simulation methods also have signifi cant limitations. To do a structural model of hospital 
mergers, researchers must assume the form that demand and costs take. They must assume the 
form of hospital objectives. They must assume the broad form of pricing conduct. Then they must 
decide for which hospitals to simulate the merger. Any of these steps can lead to biased results. The 
functional form chosen for demand affects the result of the merger simulation, and usually little 
theoretical or empirical justifi cation exists for any particular choice. Note that the logit functional 
form used in the literature reviewed above is considered a conservative choice for merger effects—it 
produces smaller merger effects than do other choices (23).
Methodological Issues For SCP Literature
Consider fi rst the measurement of price. The best measure is the price actually paid to the hospitals 
by insurers, appropriately adjusted for the treated patient’s condition and severity. The best studies 
on this dimension are those using transactions prices. Of the studies that use transactions prices, 
Dor and colleagues (18, 25, 26) have the most careful controls for patient conditions, insurance 
type, and patient severity. The least reliable measures of price are in Noether (43) who uses charges 
and Staten, Umbeck and Dunkelberg (45) who use discounts (the difference between charges and 
transaction price), neither of which corresponds very well to actual prices. Between these studies in 
terms of the quality of their price measures are the several California studies using adjusted charges. 
These prices are probably right on average, but they miss pricing differences among the different 
types of insurers and adjust their price measures only for patient conditions and not severity. 
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Next, consider the defi nition of the market and the measurement of concentration. Most studies 
defi ne markets according to geopolitical divisions such as MSAs or counties. These defi nitions do 
not, as a general rule, correspond well to economic or antitrust hospital markets. MSAs are usually 
too big and counties may be too big or too small depending on where they are along the urban-
rural continuum. Most of the 13 studies use either county or MSA as their market defi nition. The 
better market defi nitions, however, are constructed hospital-by-hospital. Simpson and Shin (44) 
defi ne each hospital’s market as a fi xed radius around it (15 miles for urban and 20 miles for rural 
hospitals). Melnick et al (41), Keeler et al (36), and Capps and Dranove (19) use the best market 
defi nitions. They construct “variable radius” market defi nitions that look at patient fl ows at the zip 
code level to infer the geographical size of the market in which each fi rm competes.
Finally, consider the inclusion of appropriate controls for marginal cost differences. These should 
include controls for wages, scale of operations, hospital teaching status, and hospital for-profi t/not-
for-profi t/government ownership status. The strongest studies in terms of cost controls are Noether 
(43), Melnick et al (41), Keeler et al (36), and Lynk and Neuman (39), and the weakest is Staten et al (45).
Methodological Issues For Event Studies
To estimate the size of the price increase that would have occurred in the absence of the merger, 
researchers construct a control group of hospitals. Ideally, these are hospitals that: 1) resemble the 
merging hospitals, and 2) are not themselves affected by the merger. Then, the researchers assume 
that the price increase that occurred among hospitals in the control group is a good estimate of the 
price increase that would have occurred among the merging hospitals had the merger not occurred. 
The estimated effect of the merger is the increase in price at the merging hospitals minus the 
increase in price at the control hospitals. For example, if two hospitals merge on January 1, 1995, 
then we might compare the prices for those two hospitals in 1994 and 1995 and discover that the 
1995 price was 10 percent higher than was the 1994 price. Suppose that the average price at the 
control hospitals was six percent higher in 1995 than in 1994. This would lead us to conclude that 
the merger caused a four percent price increase (10 percent minus six percent).
Literature On Competition And Quality
Economic theory has little conclusive to say about the effects of competition on quality. While the 
profi t margin decreases as concentration decreases (lowering the incentive to compete for patients 
via quality), the sensitivity of patient volume to quality changes probably increases as a hospital 
faces more competitors raising the incentive to compete for patients via quality. At the risk of 
oversimplifi cation, the stronger of these forces will determine how hospital consolidation affects 
quality of care. Since 2000, 10 papers have studied the relationship between hospital competition 
and the quality of care.
Researchers must overcome substantial methodological challenges to generate a reliable estimate 
of the relationship between hospital competition and the quality of care. They must identify 
appropriate indicators of hospital quality and measure hospital competition accurately. Moreover, 
variation in hospital competition must not be correlated with other, uncontrolled for, correlates of 
hospital quality. 
The most common measure of quality used is risk-adjusted mortality for a particular condition 
or procedure. The advantage of using risk-adjusted mortality as a quality marker is that it is 
straightforward to measure and mortality is unambiguously a bad outcome. The disadvantages of this 
measure (and most currently implemented hospital quality measures) are that they are susceptible 
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to measurement error and capture only one dimension of hospital quality. Hospitals sell many 
services, and, for most of those, mortality is not a relevant marker of quality. Thus, while the quality 
measures that are employed in quality analyses have validity, they are noisy markers of quality.
Most studies of the quality-concentration relationship use some form of the HHI to measure 
hospital concentration. The HHI has practical appeal as a summary measure of concentration, 
but its use in empirical analysis of hospital quality has similar problems to those discussed in 
the context of the relationship between price and concentration. Furthermore, if patients are 
more likely to go to high quality hospitals, there can be reverse causality. That is, an increase in a 
hospital’s quality may cause changes in the market HHI. Three papers (55–57) modify the way in 
which the HHI is calculated in order to avoid this reverse causality problem, while the majority of 
the literature ignores this issue. 
Literature On Hospital Costs
The hospital cost function literature evaluates the claim of scale economies by examining how 
costs, at the facility level, vary with the scale of the facility. This literature is therefore relevant 
for evaluating the effects of facilities consolidation on hospital costs. It has revealed few fi rm 
conclusions about whether hospitals exhibit increasing, decreasing, or constant returns to scale, 
although the most recent and methodologically sophisticated work does suggest signifi cant scale 
economies. Those recent fi ndings provide some support for the claim that hospital facilities 
consolidation achieve savings by producing economies of scale. There is, however, little evidence 
that hospitals achieve signifi cant cost savings via ownership consolidation alone.
The early cost function literature is reviewed in Cowing and Holtmann (70). A typical study in that 
literature examines the association between hospital average cost and number of beds. The fi ndings 
are mixed but tend to show mild increasing returns to scale for hospitals of less than 200 beds or 
so, but constant or mildly decreasing returns to scale above that size. Dranove (73) in a paper in the 
tradition of this early literature fi nds that there are no scale economies in such hospital cost-centers 
such as laundry and housekeeping for hospitals beyond about 200 beds.
Beginning in 1983 with Cowing and Holtmann (70), the hospital cost function literature began to 
incorporate signifi cant methodological improvements, as health economists began to use so-called 
“fl exible functional forms.” Some studies in that literature fi nd increasing returns to scale (70, 72, 
86), while others fi nd constant or decreasing returns (85).
The failure to reach any fi rm consensus in this fi eld is probably caused by three related problems. 
First, although hospitals provide hundreds of different services, their output is usually captured 
through highly aggregated measures such as discharges or patient-days. Second, in studies to date 
no provision is made for the severity of patients’ illnesses. Third, the failure of the literature to 
date to incorporate quality measures is a problem. Since it is quite plausible that larger hospitals 
systematically have sicker, more expensive patients and that they provide higher quality care, the 
inability to control for these things probably imparts signifi cant bias to the studies in this literature. 
 
In a sophisticated study addressing this problem, Carey (69) fi nds that, when one controls for 
unobserved, hospital-specifi c differences (presumably having to do with unmeasured case mix, 
severity and quality), hospitals appear to have much larger economies of scale. Similarly, Gaynor 
and Anderson (76), in a cost function analysis that also controls for unobserved hospital-specifi c 
differences, fi nd signifi cant increasing returns, albeit smaller than those found by Carey.
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